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Morris: Great Expectations for the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine [Atwa

COMMENT
GREAT EXPECTATIONS FOR THE REASONABLE
EXPECTATIONS DOCTRINE
[Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western National Mutual Insurance Co., 366
N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 1985)]

INTRODUCTION

Of the many areas of law that present confusion, difficulty, and
unpredictability to bench and bar alike, few, if any, rival insurance
contract law.I More precisely, judicial decisions involving the interpretation and construction of insurance contracts are disturbingly
unprincipled,2 due in part to the inadequacy of traditional contract
theories.3 In an admirable attempt to cultivate principled, consistent
decisions, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the "reasonable
expectations" doctrine4 in Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western National Mutual Insurance Co. 5 This doctrine is intended to provide Minnesota
courts with principled, non-arbitrary guidelines for interpreting and
constructing disputed policy provisions in insurance contracts. 6 An
additional aim of this doctrine is to encourage or even force insurance companies to conspicuously and concisely communicate the parameters of policy coverage. 7
This Comment will discuss the reasonable expectations doctrine
from a perspective grounded in traditional contract principles. The
Comment, however, will also address the underlying economic and
1. See Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 Ariz.
383, 391, 682 P.2d 388, 396 (1984); see generally Abraham,Judge-Made Law andJudgeMade Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151
(1981); Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV.
961 (1970); Note, A Reasonable Approach to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations as Applied to Insurance Contracts, 13 U. MICH J.L. REF. 603 (1980).
2. See Abraham, supra note 1, at 1151; Keeton, supra note 1, at 961.
3. See Note, A Common Law Alternative to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in the
Construction of Insurance Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1175, 1176 (1982).
4. For a discussion of the reasonable expectations doctrine, see infra notes 3749 and accompanying text.
5. 366 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 1985).
6. See id. at 278; Keeton, supra note 1, at 968.
7. SeeAtwater, 366 N.W.2d at 278; see also MINN. STAT. §§ 70C.06-.09 (1984) (requiring insurance contracts to be readable and legible); id. § 325G.31 (requiring
consumer contracts to be written in plain language).
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social issues that are implicated by the doctrine.8 Part I of this Comment will review the nature of the adhesion contract, the form in
which insurance policies are written, and the customary theories
used by courts to resolve the problems created by such contracts.
Part II will examine the facts, as well as the supreme court's holding
and analysis in Atwater. Part III will analyze and discuss the controversial aspects of the reasonable expectations doctrine as adopted by
the Minnesota Supreme Court. A suggested modification for future
cases is also included in Part III.
I.

ADHESION CONTRACTS AND TRADITIONAL CONTRACT THEORIES

In order to fully appreciate the insurance contract dilemma and
the desperate need to develop responsive contract theories, a brief
examination of adhesion contracts and traditional contract theories
is warranted.9
A.

Adhesion Contracts

A modem day insurance policy represents a prime example of a
standard form contract or contract of adhesion.lo The typical policy
is often drafted by an attorney who endeavors to limit the overall
scope of insurance coverage.'I The insurance company then offers
the policy on a "take it or leave it" basis.12 The prospective insured
may either reject the policy standard or accept it. He may not negotiate or alter the specific terms.' 5 Furthermore, because this is the
8. The reasonable expectations doctrine encompasses more than the technical
"niceties" of contract law. The doctrine extends to fundamental themes, concepts,
and issues of social and economic importance. For instance, insurance in general is a
"phenomenon of incalculable importance" in the distribution of risk both in and out
of the commercial marketplace. See Abraham, supra note 1, at 1151. Moreover, our
free enterprise system and its consequent division of labor depend upon the medium
of contract to ensure a secure exchange of goods and services in the market. See
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 629, 640 (1943); see also Comment, Unconscionable Business Contracts: A Doctrine
Gone Awry, 70 YALE L.J. 453, 455-56 (1961) (allocation of risk through business contracts can affect the price levels of a free market system).
9. Standard form (adhesion) contracts account for more than 99 percent of all
contracts made. Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971). For an informative review of the history
behind the adhesion contract, see Issacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34
(1917).
10. Note, supra note 3, at 1178; see Keeton, supra note 1, at 966; Note, supra note
1, at 604.
11. See 7 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 900, at 19 (3d
ed. 1963); Note, supra note 3, at 1179.
12. Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 277; 7 S. WILLISTON, supra note I1, § 900, at 19; Note,
supra note 1, at 604.
13. See 7 S. WILLISTON, supra note 11, § 900, at 29; Note, supra note 1, at 604.
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standard practice throughout the insurance industry, the prospective
insured has no real bargaining power and is vulnerable to overreach4
ing by the insurance company.'
Given the inherent complexity and confusion of many insurance
contracts, the insured is deterred from inspecting the policy either
before or after it is accepted.15 Moreover, provisions excluding or
limiting coverage are not openly discussed between the insured and
the agent.16 Consequently, the insured remains ignorant of the limiting provisions and relies on nonexistent or deficient coverage. 17
B.

TraditionalContract Theories

When confronted with issues regarding the existence or extent of
insurance coverage, courts customarily turn to the language of the
pertinent contract provisions in order to establish the intent of the
parties.18 A court interprets the provisions by reference to the language of the entire contract. 19 The provisions will ordinarily be disThe absence of choice of policy or contract terms is a principal reason why insurance
contracts are singled out as inherently oppressive. See Kessler, supra note 8, at 631.
14. See Keeton, supra note 1, at 963; Comment, supra note 8, at 453. The Atwater
court specifically noted the following:
Most courts recognize the great disparity in bargaining power between insurance companies and those who seek insurance. Further, they recognize
that, in the majority of cases, a lay person lacks the necessary skills to read
and understand insurance policies, which are typcially long, set out in very
small type and written from a legalistic or insurance expert's perspective.
Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 277.
15. Policies are drafted in legal terms of art. Note, supra note 3, at 1180. In
addition, the insurer does not expect the insured to read the terms of the contract.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 comment b (1981) (hereinafter cited
as RESTATEMENT). In an attempt to simplify the language contained in insurance contracts and contracts in general, the Minnesota Legislature has enacted the "Readability of Insurance Policies Act," MINN. STAT. §§ 72C.01-.13 (1984), and the "Plain
Language Contract Act," MINN. STAT. §§ 325G.29-.37 (1984). The former aims at
providing insurance policies that are readable and understandable to a person of
average intelligence, experience, and education. Id. § 72C.02. It outlines specific
tests and standards for readability, legibility, format, and for the coversheet. Id.
§§ 72C.05-.09. The Plain Language Contract Act, on the other hand, requires that
every consumer contract (involving a purchase of goods and services) "be written in a
clear and coherent manner using words with common and everyday meanings and
shall be appropriately divided and captioned by its various sections." Id. § 325G.32.
16. See Note, supra note 3, at 1181.
17. See id. See also Abraham, supra note 1, at 1169-75 (outlining the benefits of an
informed insured).
18. See 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 538, at 55 (1960); 2 G. COUCH,
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW 15:8, at 136-44 (2d ed. 1984). As a general rule, the
matter of interpretation and construction is a matter of law, as opposed to a question
of fact. 3 A. CORBIN, supra, § 554, at 225; 2 G. COUCH, s.upra, § 15:3, at 116.
19. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, § 202(2) (1981); 13J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE
LAW AND PRACTICE § 7383, at 30-49 (1976); 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 20, § 549, at 18393; 2 G. COUCH, supra note 18, § 15:29, at 216.
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positive of the coverage issue if they are determined by the court to
be clear and unambiguous.20 If, however, the provisions are found
to be ambiguous, either inherently or in context of the entire contract, they are construed in "favor of the insured" or "against the
insurer" who is the drafting party. 2 ' This traditional theory is known
as the contract of adhesion doctrine22 and is still recognized by a
significant number ofjurisdictions.23 The doctrine has been severely
criticized, however, because courts often fabricate ambiguity in order
to avoid rendering an unfair and unjust decision.24 The fabricated
finding of ambiguity makes judicial decisions interpreting insurance
20. See 13J. APPLEMAN, supra note 19, § 7384, at 50-55; 2 G. COUCH, supra note
18, § 15:4, at 122-23. But cf. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 18, § 535, at 15-16. Professor
Corbin seriously questions whether words are ever "plain and clear" and capable of
only one true meaning:
There is no single rule of interpretation of language, and there are no
rules of interpretation taken all together, that will infallibly lead to the one
correct understanding and meaning. In understanding the variable expressions of others, men must do the best they can and results must be determined even though the understanding may be faulty. There is in fact no
,one correct' meaning of an expression; and the party choosing the expression may have no clear and conscious meaning of his own. In reading each
other's words, men certainly see through a glass darkly; and yet it is necessary for men to act upon their understanding, and it is necessary to hold
men responsible for inducing others thus to act.
Id. (citations omitted).
[Slome of the surrounding circumstances always must be known before the
meaning of the words can be plain and clear; and proof of the circumstances
may make a meaning plain and clear when in the absence of such proof
some other meaning may also have seemed plain and clear.
Id. § 542, at 100-03 (citations omitted).
21. RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, § 206; 13J. APPLEMAN, supra note 19, § 7401; 3
A. CORBIN, supra note 19, § 559; 2 G. COUCH, supra note 18, § 15:74; 7 S. WILLISTON,
supra note 11, § 900 at 18.
22. See Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 277; Mills v. Agrichemical Aviation, Inc., 250
N.W.2d 663, 670 (N.D. 1977); Perlet, The Insurance Contract and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectation, 6 F. 116, 117-118 (1970). In North Dakota, the contract of adhesion
doctrine has been codified into statutory law. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-19 (1975).
23. Eight states still recognize the contract of adhesion doctrine. See Connecticut
Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Aguilar, 579 F. Supp. 1201, 1205 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Kates v. St.
Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 509 F. Supp. 477, 490-91 (D. Mass. 1981) (ironically,
this decision was written by Judge, formerly Professor, Keeton); Wright v. Newman,
598 F. Supp. 1178, 1205 (W.D. Mo. 1984); American Home Prod. Corp. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485, 1492 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Urtado v. Shupe, 33 Colo.
App. 162, 167, 517 P.2d 1357, 1359-60 (1973) (both courts noted that Colorado had
not adopted the reasonable expectations doctrine); Meckert v. Transamerica Ins.
Co., 701 P.2d 217, 221 (Idaho 1985); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Adkisson, 121 II.
App. 3d 224, 229, 459 N.E.2d 310, 312-13 (1984); Markline Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
384 Mass. 139, 141-42, 424 N.E.2d 464, 465-66 (1981); Thompson v. Occidental Life
Ins. Co. of Cal., 90 N.M. 620, 621, 567 P.2d 62, 63 (1977); Larson v. Transamerica
Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 41 Or. App. 311, 319, 597 P.2d 1292, 1297 (1979); Ryan v.
Harrison, 699 P.2d 230, 233 (Wash. 1985).
24. See 7 S. WILLISTON, supra note 11, § 900, at 17.
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contracts arbitrary and unprincipled.25
Even if contract terms are clear and unambiguous, courts commonly refuse to enforce the terms, relying on other traditional contract theories such as public policy,26 unconscionability,27 or
equitable estoppel.28 The theories of public policy and unconsciona25. See 13J. APPLEMAN, supra note 19, § 7402, at 289-91 (stating rule against fictitious ambiguity); 2 G. CoucH, supra note 20, § 15:86 (condemning simulated
ambiguity).
26. See, e.g., Nygaard v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 301 Minn. 10, 14-15, 221
N.W.2d 151, 154 (1974)(court awarded coverage even though automobile insurance
provisions would have precluded coverage because provisions contravened intent of
state statute). See RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, § 207; 3 A. CORBIN, Supra note 18,
§ 550, at 194-96; see also In re Peterson's Estate, 230 Minn. 478, 483, 42 N.W.2d 59,
63 (1950); see generally Allum v. MedCenter Health Care, Inc., 371 N.W.2d 557, 560
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985)(indemnification agreement that violates public policy is void);
Rector v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 369 N.W.2d 589, 592-93 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985).
27. See American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. Williams, 80 Mich. App. 125, 132, 263
N.W.2d 311, 315 (1977) (Kaufman, J., dissenting) (despite majority's failure to find
ambiguity, minority argued that the policy provisions were unenforceable for reasons
of unconscionability); Foursquare Properties Joint Venture I v. Johnny's Loaf &
Stein, Ltd., 116 Wis. 2d 679, 681, 343 N.W.2d 126, 128 (1983) (Wisconsin Supreme
Court concluded that any error made by the trial court regarding ambiguity of contract clause is harmless because of unconscionability of the clause); RESTATEMENT,
supra note 15, § 208; 6A A. CORBIN, supra note 18, § 1376, at 21. See also U.C.C. § 2302(l) (1978); see generally Dorso Trailer Sales, Inc. v. American Body and Trailer,
Inc., 372 N.W.2d 412, 415 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)(finding of unconscionability requires inequality in bargaining power); Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31
U. PIr. L. REV. 1-80 (1969)(commenting on U.C.C. § 2-302).
28. See 16BJ. APPLEMAN, supra note 19, § 9088, at 554-61; 2 G. CoucH, sipra note
18, § 71:1; Note, supra note 3, at 1182. Professor Keeton includes the doctrines of
estoppel and waiver under the general principle of "detrimental reliance." See Keeton, supra note 1, at 977-85. Professor Keeton, however, makes a concerted effort to
distinguish the two doctrines. According to Professor Keeton, a waiver involves a
voluntary relinquishment of a known right by the insurer; whereas estoppel entails an
insured's detrimental reliance on some representation for which the insurer is accountable. Id. at 964. In Minnesota, the doctrine of equitable estoppel cannot be
invoked to enlarge policy coverage. See Shannon v. Great American Ins. Co., 276
N.W.2d 77, 78 (Minn. 1979) (equitable estoppel will not expand coverage of policy
even if insurer offers to settle for more than policy limits); Twin City Hide v.Transamerica Ins. Co., 358 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (estoppel not used to
expand policy coverage even though insurance agent had represented to insured that
insured was covered); Minnesota Mut. Fire and Cas. Co. v. Rudzinski, 347 N.W.2d
848, 851 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (automobile insurer not estopped from reimbursement of payments made by mistake). The doctrine of equitable estoppel, however,
can be invoked to prevent forfeiture. See Seavey v. Erickson, 244 Minn. 232, 242, 69
N.W.2d 889, 896 (1955)(insurer estopped from asserting the forfeiture provisions of
the policy were insurer failed to notify insured of forfeiture of rights due to nonpayment of premiums). See generally Northern Petrochemical Co.v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co.,
277 N.W.2d 408, 410 (Minn. 1979) (evidence sufficient to support application of equitable estoppel); Transamerica Ins. Group v. Paul, 267 N.W.2d 180, 183 (Minn.
1978) (outlining the five prerequisites of estoppel); Bethesda Lutheran Church v.
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bility, however, have the same shortcoming as the contract of adhesion doctrine. Neither theory has specific standards or rules
governing its application.29 Thus, courts can arbitrarily apply these
Twin City Const. Co., 356 N.W.2d 344, 349 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (whether elements of equitable estoppel are present is a question of fact).
29. See In re Peterson's Estate, 230 Minn. 478, 483, 42 N.W.2d 59, 63 (1950)
(regarding public policy); Murray, supra note 27, at 1-3 (concerning unconscionability).
In the case of Peterson's Estate, the Minnesota Supreme Court outlined a general
description of the types of cases that contravene public policy:
Generally speaking, a contract is not void as against public policy unless it is
injurious to the interests of the public or contravenes some established interest of society. On the other hand, contracts are contrary to public policy
if they clearly tend to injure public health or morals, the fundamental rights
of the individual, or if they undermine confidence in the impartiality of the
administration of justice.
Peterson s Estate, 230 Minn. at 483, 42 N.W.2d at 63. The Restatement, proposes a "balancing" approach in determining when a contract, in violation of "public policy," is
unenforceable.
§ 178. When a Term is Unenforceable on Grounds of Public Policy
(1) A promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds
of public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest
in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public
policy against the enforcement of such terms.
(2) In weighing the interest in the enforcement of a term, account is taken
of
(a) the parties' justified expectations,
(b) any forfeiture that would result if enforcement were denied, and
(c) any special public interest in the enforcement of the particular
term.
(3) In weighing a public policy against enforcement of a term, account is
taken of
(a) the strength of that policy as manifested by legislation or judicial
decisions,
(b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further that
policy,
(c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to
which it was deliberate, and
(d) the directness of the connection between that misconduct and the
term.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, § 178. See also id. comment b. The rules or standards
for applying the doctrine of unconscionability are equally indefinite. The basic test is
"whether, in the light of the general commercial background and the commercial
needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one sided as to be
unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the
contract." U.C.C. § 2-302, comment one (1978).
In Minnesota, the courts examine the procedural and substantive aspects of the
contract and determine: (1) whether the party asserting unconscionability had no
"meaningful choice" but to enter the agreement; and (2) whether the contract or
specific term is "unreasonably favorable to the other party." See Dorso Trailer Sales.
372 N.W.2d at 415 (citing RJM Sales & Marketing, Inc. v. Banfi Prod. Corp., 546 F.
Supp. 1368, 1375 (D.Minn. 1982)); see also Note, supra note 3, at 1181. The Restatement suggests that courts use two factors-inadequacy of consideration and absence
of bargaining power-in determining whether a contract or specific term is unconscionable. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, § 208, comments c, d, & e.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol12/iss2/5

6

Morris: Great Expectations for the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine [Atwa
1986]

REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS DOCTRINE

theories, thereby producing unprincipled and inconsistent decisions.30 Equitable estoppel, on the other hand, has a specific standard for application.31 The scope of equitable estoppel, however, is
limited to an examination of the parties' conduct as opposed to the
contract language itself.32 Given the shortcomings of these previous
theories of contract interpretation, judges and attorneys needed an
objective, principled contract theory to apply when construing the
language of a disputed insurance policy provision.33
The Minnesota Supreme Court previously recognized the contract
of adhesion doctrine.34 In Atwater, the court acknowledged the dire
need for a responsive theory of insurance contract interpretation35
and joined the progressive trend toward the recognition of the reasonable expectations doctrine36
30. Cf Murray, supra note 27, at 4-5 (commenting on the gross absence of principled judicial decisions and the resulting inconsistency with respect to unconscionability cases); Trakman, The Effect of Illegality in the Law of Contract: Suggestionsfor Reform,
55 CAN. B. REV. 625, 625-30 (1977) (commenting on the significant judicial confusion surrounding the contract theories of illegality and public policy).
31. The doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked if the following five requirements are satisfied:
(1) There must be a misrepresentation of mateial fact;
(2) The party to be estopped must be shown to have known that the representation was false;
(3) The party to be estopped must have intended that the representation be
acted upon;
(4) The party asserting estoppel must not have had knowledge of the true facts;
and
(5) The party asserting estoppel must have relied on the misrepresentation to
his detriment.
Transamenica, 267 N.W.2d at 183.
32. See Abraham, supra note 1, at 1178-80; Keeton, supra note 1, at 973; Note,
supra note 3, at 1182. The doctrine of equitable estoppel is often entangled with
issues of agency law. Specifically, the issue may center on whether the agent had the
requisite authority to act as he did. See Keeton, supra note 1, at 979-81. See generally,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 7, 8, 26, 27, 33 & 34 (1958) (concerning authority, apparent authority, and interpreted or "implied" authority).
33. See supra note I and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Simon v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 262 Minn. 378, 385, 115
N.W.2d 40, 45 (1962) (court will not redraft insurance contracts absent ambiguous
language); Transameica, 358 N.W.2d at 93 (interpretation of insurance contract not
allowed if the contractual language is not ambiguous); see also supra notes 10-18 and
accompanying text.
35. Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 275-79.
36. A number of state and federal courts have adopted the reasonable expectations doctrine. See, e.g., Berne v. Aetna Ins. Co., 604 F. Supp. 958, 960 (D.C.V.I.
1985) (requiring ambiguity); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 597 F.
Supp. 1515, 1523-24 (D.D.C. 1984); Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Marnel, 587 F.
Supp. 622, 624 (D. Conn. 1983) (requiring ambiguity before applying reasonable
expectations doctrine); Fritz v. Old Am. Ins. Co., 354 F. Supp. 514, 516-17 (S.D. Tex.
1973) (requiring ambiguity); Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284-85 (Alaska 1979)(ambiguity not required); Lambert v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 331 So.2d 260, 263-64 (Ala.
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The doctrine's immediate function is to accomplish what its name
implies, effectuating the insured's reasonable expectations with respect to his insurance contract.3 7 When a court construes a disputed
policy provision, it will look to the reasonable expectations of the
insured.38 More importantly, the doctrine represents an objective
and principled means of construing insurance contract language.39
The doctrine allows the court to interpret contract language without
fabricating ambiguity and without resorting to arbitrary application
of public policy or unconscionability doctrines in order to avoid un1976); Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 383,
389, 682 P.2d 388, 394-95 (1984)(other factors considered as well as ambiguity);
Smith v. Westland Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 3d 111, 121-26, 539 P.2d 433, 441-43, 123
Cal. Rptr. 649, 657-58 (1975) (requiring ambiguity before applying the reasonable
expectations doctrine); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Ball, 127 Cal. App. 3d 568,
572, 179 Cal. Rptr. 644, 646-47 (1981); Hallowell v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.,
443 A.2d 925, 926-27 (Del. 1982) (requiring ambiguity); Hawaiian Ins. and Guar. Co.
v. Brooks, 686 P.2d 23, 27 (Hawaii 1984); American Economy Ins. Co. v. Liggett, 426
N.E.2d 136, 141, 144 (Ind. 1981) (requiring that exclusion be explicit); Chipokas v.
Travelers Indem. Co., 267 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Iowa 1978) (requiring the ordinary layman to be "misguided" after reading the policy); C &J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut.
Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 176-77 (Iowa 1975); Estrin Const. Co. v. Aetna Cas. and
Sur. Co., 612 S.W.2d 413, 420-25 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (ambiguity not required);
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle, 656 P.2d 820, 824 (Mont. 1983) (implying that ambiguity is not required); Grimes v. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co., 120 N.H. 718, 722-23,
422 A.2d 1312, 1315 (1980) (interpretation of policy terms is only a factor to be
considered in formulating reasonable expectations); Magulas v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
114 N.H. 704, 706-07, 327 A.2d 608, 609-10 (1974); DiOrio v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins.
Co., 79 N.J. 257, 269, 398 A.2d 1274, 1280 (1979) (requiring ambiguity); Historic
Smithville Dev. Co. v. Chelsea Title & Guar. Co., 184 NJ. Super. 282, 288, 445 A.2d
1174, 1177-78 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981) afd. 190 NJ. Super. 567, 464 A.2d
1177 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. C.G. Tate Const. Co.,
303 N.C. 387, 395, 279 S.E.2d 769, 773-74 (1981); Bierer v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 314
Pa. Super. 397, 461 A.2d 216, 220-21, (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983)(ambiguity not required);
Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 479 Pa. 579, 588-89, 388 A.2d 1346, 1353
(1978), cert. denied, Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Collister, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979); Brown
v. Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d 426, 442, 369 N.W.2d 677, 686 (1985) (requiring ambiguity);
Gross v. Lloyds of London Ins. Co., 121 Wis. 2d 78, 87, 358 N.W.2d 266, 271 (1984)
(requiring ambiguity). Kentucky and Michigan may adopt the reasonable expectations doctrine in the future. See Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Stanfield, 581 S.W.2d 555, 55859 (Ky. 1979)(citing numerous cases in which the doctrine was either adopted or
applied); Bradley v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 1, 60-61, n.69, 294 N.W.2d 141,
162-63, n.69, (1980) (citing Professor Keeton's article advocating the doctrine).
37. See Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 277 (citing Keeton, supra note 1, at 967); Note,
supra note 1, at 608-09; Note, supra note 3, at 1186.
38. See Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 278. Despite the element of"reasonableness", the
doctrine provides a much needed standard. Keeton, supra note i, at 966-74.
39. Cf Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 278 (stating that the reasonable expectations doctrine eliminates the inclination to stretch and arbitrarily apply existing contract
theories).
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just decisions.40
There are two forms of the reasonable expectations doctrine. The
traditional or interpretive form resembles the contract of adhesion
doctrine by requiring ambiguity as a condition precedent to application.41 Conversely, the extended or "Keeton" form is applied regardless of ambiguity.42
The reasonable expectations doctrine is a relatively recent contract theory.43 Judge Learned Hand is credited with creating the
concept of reasonable expectations in 1947.44 It was not until the
1960's, however, that the concept of reasonable expectations developed into an efficacious judicial doctrine.45 The California46 and
New Jersey Supreme Courts4 7 have been instrumental in the development of the doctrine. Both of these courts initially adhered to the
40. See id. at 277; Note, supra note 3, at 1183-85; Note, supra note 1, at 608-11.
41. Atwate, 366 N.W.2d at 277; see Keeton, supra note 1, at 967; Note, supra note
3, at 1186-87; Note, supra note 1, at 611-19. In his treatise, Professor Corbin makes a
concerted effort to distinguish "interpretation" from "construction." 3 A. CORBIN,
supra note 18, § 534, at 492-95.
By 'interpretation of language' we determine what ideas that language induces in other persons. By 'construction of the contract,' as that term will
be used here, we determine its legal operation - its effect upon the action
of courts and administrative officials. If we make this distincton, then the
construction of a contract starts with the interpretation of its language but
does not end with it; while the process of interpretation stops wholly short
of a determination of the legal relations of the parties. When a court gives a
construction to the contract as that is affected by events subsequent to its
making and not foreseen by the parties, it is departing very far from mere
interpretation of their symbols of expression, although even then it may
claim somewhat erroneously to be giving effect to the 'intention' of the
parties.
Id. at 492-93. Thus, the "interpretive" form of the reasonable expectations doctrine
obligates the court to first ascertain the meaning of the words and determine whether
ambiguity exists. The court may only indulge in contract construction if ambiguity
exists. Conversely, the extended form of the reasonable expectations doctrine allows
the court to exercise contract construction from the outset. Id.
42. Keeton, supra note 1, at 968.
43. Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 277; see also infra note 46 and accompanying text.
44. Judge Learned Hand is credited with the creation of the expectations
principle:
An underwriter might so understand the phrase, when read in its context,
but the application was not to be submitted to underwriters; it was to go to
persons utterly unacquainted with the niceties of life insurance, who would
read it colloquially. It is the understanding of such persons that counts.
Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 601 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 849 (1947). See Keeton, supra note 1, at 969; Note, supra note 3, at 1184.
45. See Abraham, supra note 1, at 1158, 1164; Note, supra note 3, at 1185; Note,
The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Massachusetts and New Hampshire: A Comparative
Analysis, 17 NEW ENG. L. REV. 891, 893-900 (1982).
46. See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104
(1966).
47. See Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 34 NJ. 475, 170 A.2d 22 (1961).
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extended form of the doctrine.48 Ironically, they have since joined
the majority of jurisdictions recognizing the traditional form.49 The
following section reviews the Atwater decision and examines the Minnesota Supreme Court's adoption of the extended form of the reasonable expectations doctrine.
II.

THE ATIATER DECISION

A.

Facts

The Atwater Creamery Company, in addition to being a creamery,
is a supplier of farm chemicals in Atwater, Minnesota.50 Included in
the Atwater complex is a warehouse used for the storage of fertilizer
and farm chemicals.51 The warehouse was burglarized without evidence of forceable entry between Saturday, April 9, 1977 and the
following Monday. 5 2 Chemicals valued at $15,000 were stolen using
a company truck that had been parked inside the warehouse building.53 The ensuing investigation determined that none of the company's past or present employees were involved with the burglary.54
At the time of the burglary, the company was insured by the Western National Mutual Insurance Company under a "Mercantile-OpenStock" burglary policy.55 The policy, however, contained a definition of burglary which essentially required visible signs of forceable
entry as a condition precedent to coverage. 56 The insurance agent
48. See Perlet, The Insurance Contract and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 6 F.
116, 118-22 (1971).
49. For the states which have adopted the reasonable expectations doctrine, see
supra note 36.
50. Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 274.
51. Id. at 274. See also Brief for Appellant at 6 & Appendix at 23-24, Atwater
Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l. Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 1985).
52. Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 274.
53. Id.
54. Id. An investigation was also performed by the Kandiyohi County Sheriff's
Department. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. Also at issue in this case was whether the policy's definition of burglary
must conform to the statutory definition outlined in MINN. STAT. § 609.58, subd. 2
(1982). The statute defined burglary as:
Whoever enters a building without the consent of the person in lawful possession . . . with intent to commit a crime in it, or whoever remains within a
building without the consent of the person in lawful authority, with intent to
commit a crime in it, commits burglary.
Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 275 (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.58, subd. 2). The insurance
policy, on the other hand, defined burglary as:
[T]he felonious abstraction of insured property (1) from within the premises
by a person making felonious entry therein by actual force and violence, of
which force and violence there are visible marks made by tools, explosives,
electricity or chemicals upon, or physical damage to, the exterior of the
premises at the place of such entry, or. . . (3) from within the premises by a
person making felonious exit therefrom by actual force and violence as evi-
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who issued the policy testified that he had mentioned this particular
provision to either the Board of Directors or the plant manager. 5 7
No one at the company, however, read the insurance policy. Even
though the plant manager attempted to read the policy, he failed to
read it completely because he could not understand the language
contained in the text. 58 The company filed a claim with its insurer,
but was denied coverage because the condition precedent had not
been satisfied; specifically, there were no visible signs of forceable
entry.59
B.

Holding and Analysis

The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that the definition of burglary contained in the insurance contract was not ambiguous.60
Nonetheless, the court concluded that the insurer should cover the
loss because Atwater reasonably expected that its burglary insurance
would cover a burglary.61 The court consequently reversed the trial
denced by visible marks made by tools, explosives, electricity or chemicals
upon, or physical damage to, the interior of the premises at the place of such
exit.
Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 275.
57. Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 274.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 276.
61. Id. at 278-79. Of incidental interest is the effect of the reasonable expectations doctrine on the parol evidence rule. The parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive law that preserves the integrity of a written contract by precluding evidence
of contradictory or varying terms. See 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 573
(1960); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-9 (2d ed. 1980); 9J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 2400,
2425 (Chadbourn rev. 1981). Thus, it encourages parties to put their agreements in
writing. See Hield v. Thyberg, 347 N.W.2d 503, 507 (Minn. 1984). Most extrinsic
evidence of agreements contemporaneous to the written contract is excluded or
inadmissible. See Material Movers, Inc. v. Hill, 316 N.W.2d 13, 17 (Minn. 1982). See
generally MINN. STAT. §§ 366.2-.202 (1984).
The rule does not apply if the writing is inherently ambiguous, incomplete, or
silent on a term reasonably expected to be included in the writing. See Hield, 347
N.W.2d at 507. Moreover, evidence regarding a subsequent modification or condition precedent of the written agreement is exempt from the parol evidence rule. See
Nord v. Herreid, 305 N.W.2d 337, 339-40 (Minn. 1981).
A potential conflict exists between the parol evidence rule and the extended
form of the reasonable expectations doctrine, which is applied regardless of unambiguous language. If, for instance, the claimant alleged terms that varied from those
contained in an unambiguous, complete, and integrated standardized contract, there
would be a direct conflict between the parol evidence rule (preserving the integrity of
the terms) and the extended form of the reasonable expectations doctrine (construing the terms in accordance with the objective expectations of the insured). Section
211(1) of the Restatement attempts to unify these difficult concepts. RESTATEMENT,
supra note 15, § 211 (1). See Murray, The Parol Evidence Process and Standardized Agreements under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1342, 1374 (1975)
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court's decision,62 which had upheld the policy provision in a directed verdict. 63 Thus, the supreme court joined the minority ofjurisdictions recognizing the extended form of the reasonable
expectations doctrine. 64 The majority opinion had the support of
five of the nine justices.65 Four justices concurred specially, disapproving of the extended form of the doctrine. This minority advocated the traditional form of the doctrine, but nevertheless, agreed
with the result. 6 6 Consequently, the holding in Atwater is somewhat
tenuous with respect to the extended form of the reasonable expectations doctrine.
The supreme court also examined and then dismissed the various
doctrines and theories utilized by other courts in the interpretation
and construction of similar burglary definitions.67 It implicitly rejected the traditional contract of adhesion doctrine, whereby if the
definition is found ambiguous, it is construed in favor of the insured,
permitting coverage. 68 Moreover, the contract of adhesion doctrine
provides that if the definition is clear and concise, it must be honored
by a court. 6 9 The supreme court was unwilling to fabricate ambiguity because the language was clear and unambiguous.70 Yet the
court also refused to enforce the condition precedent contained in
the burglary definition and awarded coverage. 7 '
(commenting on § 237 which is currently embodied in § 211). According to § 211 (1),
if the party assenting to a standardized contract signs the writing and "has reason to
believe that like writings are regularly used to embody terms of agreements of the
same type." he adopts the writing as an integrated agreement. RESTATEMENT, supra
note 15, § 211 (1). Presumably the assenting party must demonstrate that he or she
reasonably believed the form agreement to be the kind typically used in similar transactions. See Murray, supra, at 1375. Hence, the reasonable belief of the assenting
party dictates the application of the parol evidence rule. As to consumers, it might be
difficult to demonstrate that the requisite reasonable belief existed. If, however, this
reasonable belief is established, the parol evidence rule would preclude alleged
terms, based on reasonable expectations, that deviate from written policy provisions.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, § 211(1) (1979); Murray, supra note 61, at 1374-75.
62. Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 279.
63. The policy provision in question required signs of forceable entry as a prerequisite to coverage. Id. at 274.
64. See supra note 36. Approximately one-third of all the jurisdictions listed in
note 36 recognize the extended form of the reasonable expectations doctrine. See
supra note 36.

65. This case was heard and decided en banc. Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 273. The
majority consisted of five justices (Amdahl, Wahl, Yetka, Todd, and Scott). Fourjustices (Simonett, Peterson, Kelley, and Coyne) concurred specially. Id. at 279-80.
66. Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 279-80.
67. Id. at 275-76.
68. Id.; see also id. at 278 (the supreme court inferred that in the past courts had to
"bend" traditional contract principles to achieve equity and justice).
69. See supra note 20.

70. Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 276.
71. Id. at 278-79.
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Moreover, the supreme court declined to apply the "purpose"
doctrine.72 According to this doctrine, if the underlying purpose of
the provision is satisfied, the condition precedent would be disregarded and coverage would be awarded. 73 Thus, in Atwater, if the
court were assured that the burglary was not an "inside job", the
provision requiring signs of forced entry would be ignored and the
company would be covered. The court, however, felt uncomfortable
with this approach because it believed that insurance companies have
the right to literally limit the "risk against which it will indemnify
7
insureds." 4
Finally, the court refused to adopt the "evidential" theory,
whereby courts have determined that despite the restrictive language, the burglary definitions merely suggest one form of evidence
which may be used to demonstrate a burglary.75 Again, the court
acknowledged the insurer's right to literally limit its liability and
voiced its disapproval of any doctrine, including the evidential theory
that circumscribes this right.76 Through the process of elimination,

the court arrived at the reasonable expectations doctrine.
The incorporation of the reasonable expectations doctrine represents the true significance of the supreme court's decision. As previously stated, the doctrine's immediate function is to effectuate the
insured's reasonable expectations with respect to his insurance contract. 77 Therefore, when a court must construe a disputed provision
in an insurance policy or contract, it will look to the reasonable expectations of the insured. 78
The supreme court enumerated three justifications for adopting
72. Id. at 276.
73. Id. The purposes of the condition precedent, requirement of visible signs of

forced entry are to protect insurance companies from fraud by way of "inside jobs"
and to encourage insureds to reasonably secure the premises. Id. Arguably, because
the investigators determined that the burglary was not an "inside job," and because
the trial court found the premises to be secure, neither purpose is advanced by requiring the condition precedent to be satisfied. Id. See Kretschmer's House of Appliances, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 410 S.W.2d 617, 618-19 (Ky.
1966).
74. See Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 276.
75. Id. In Ferguson v. Phoenix Assurance Co. of New York, 189 Kan. 459, 370
P.2d 379 (1962), the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that where a requirement of evidence is included in an insurance contract and the purpose of the requirement is not
advanced by enforcing it, judicial enforcement of such a requirement violates public
policy, unless the rule is found under the provision labeled EXCLUSIONS. Id. at
470-71, 370 P.2d at 387. The court further stated that such a rule is not comprehensive with respect to the particular types of evidence needed to establish a burglary.
Id. Hence, the evidential theory entails the examination of the provision's underlying
purpose. See id.
76. Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 275-76.
77. See id. at 277; Keeton, supra note 1, at 967-68.
78. See Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 278; Note, supra note 3, at 1184.
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the doctrine. First, the doctrine affords protection to the insured
who lacks the bargaining power and the technical knowledge to understand insurance policies. 79 Second, the doctrine gives courts
guidelines by which to construe insurance contracts.8 0 As a result,
the courts will not have to depend on antiquated principles or strain
the application of these principles to achieve justice.81 Third, the

doctrine will encourage insurers and their agents to communicate
coverage and exclusions in a clear and concise manner. 8 2
When determining what constitutes "reasonable expectations,"
the supreme court prescribed a case-by-case analysis83 and recommended the following relevant criteria: (1) whether the language of
the insurance contract is ambiguous; (2) whether the insurer or its
agent disclosed any obscure conditions or exclusions; and
(3) whether a particular provision involves a matter of general public
knowledge. 8 4 The court did not specifically state that the list of factors was to be comprehensive, but rather, implied a totality-of-thecircumstances analysis for determining reasonableness.8 5
79. See Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 277; Keeton, supra note 1,at 966-68. See also Note,
supra note 1, at 608 (regarding the doctrine as a neutralizing force to the disparity in
bargaining position). There is widespread debate on whether there exists a disparity
in bargaining power between commercial parties. See generally Ostrager & Ichel,
Should the Business Insurance Policy Be ConstructedAgainst the Insurer? Another Look At the
Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 33 FED'N. INS. COUNS. Q. 273 (1983). One author
states that bargaining power stems from knowledge, acumen, and market status. See
Comment, supra note 8, at 455. The insurance contract in Atwater is between an insurance company and a commercial business. See Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 274. Arguably, the reasonable expectations doctrine should not apply when the insured is a
commercial business, as in this case. Many small businesses, however, lack bargaining power when dealing with larger, powerful commercial businesses, and merit protection from overreaching. See Comment, supra note 8, at 455.
80. See Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 278; Keeton, supra note 1, at 966-74 (discussing
the emergence of reasonable expectations as a legal principle).
81. See Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 278.
82. See id. The Atwater case involved a "hidden exclusion." This is defined as
exclusionary language couched in contract provisions which are not conspicuously
labeled as exclusionary provisions, but rather as definition sections. See Atwate, 366
N.W.2d at 277-78 (citing C&J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co., 227
N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975)). Conceivably, the problem of the hidden exclusion should
be alleviated, if not eliminated, by the Readability of Insurance Act, MINN. STAT.
§§ 72C.05-.08 (1984).
83. Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 278 (court directs the fact-finder to consider the surrounding circumstances of a particular case when determining reasonable
expectations).
84. Id. at 278. Professor Keeton states that an insurer can effectively avoid liability for coverage despite the reasonable expectations doctrine, if the insurer makes an
explicit, conspicuous qualification or limitation effective by calling it to the attention
of the potential policyholder at the time of contracting. Keeton, supra note 1,at 968.
85. See supra note 83; Note, supra note 1, at 610 (stating that reasonable expectations depend upon the present circumstances). See also 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 18,
§ 536, at 28 (recognizing the importance of considering the "surrounding circum-
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Of paramount importance is the supreme court's refusal to adopt
the common version of the reasonable expectations doctrine.86 In
adopting the extended or "Keeton" version,87 the court recognized
several practical constraints imposed on consumers purchasing insurance that justified the more liberal approach.88 First, purchasers
have no bargaining power and cannot negotiate the terms. Second,
most purchasers do not see the policy until after the first premium is
paid. Third, even if they attempt to read it, they often cannot fully
understand it.89 As noted above, however, ambiguity or the lack of it
remains a relevant factor in determining reasonable expectations.90
Even in attempting to protect the purchaser, the supreme court
emphasized that the extended version of the doctrine does not excuse the insured from reading the contract. 9 ' The insured will be
held to a "reasonable knowledge" of the literal terms and conditions
of the contract, which will dictate the reasonableness of expectations.92 The court offered a final caveat: "Properly used, the doctrine will result in coverage in some cases and in no coverage in
stances"). Whether the extended form of the reasonable expectations doctrine is a
question of fact or law is of immense significance. The interpretation and construction of contracts is traditionally a question of law. See 2 G. CoucH, supra note 18,
§ 15:3, at 116; 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 18, § 554, at 225. The Minnesota Supreme
Court, however, stated that the "fact-finder should determine whether [the] expectations were reasonable under the circumstances," inferring that perhaps the doctrine
is a question of fact. See Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 278. Moreover, section 212 of the
Restatement states that there are certain instances where interpretation is a question of
fact. Section 212 offers a compromise for the above dilemma by stating that issues of
interpretation, involving extrinsic evidence (i.e. surrounding circumstances), are only
left to the judge "where the evidence is so clear that no reasonable person would
determine the issue in any way but one." RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, § 212 comment e. See also C &J Fertilizer, 227 N.W.2d at 172-73 (Iowa 1975)(determination by
court unless dependent on extrinsic evidence or "choice among reasonable
inferences").
86. Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 278-79 (despite finding the contract language unambiguous, the court effectuated the insured's reasonable expectations).
87. Id. at 277 (citing "Keeton's view" of ambiguity); see Keeton, supra note 1, at
966-77; Note, supra note 1, at 611.
88. See Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 277; Note, supra note 1, at 612 (commenting on
how the protection of the insured's reasonable expectations becomes essential when
the realities of the insurance sales transaction are examined). Hence, the extended
form of the reasonable expectations doctrine is responsive to the practical aspects of
an insurance policy transaction.
89. See Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 277; Abraham, supra note 1, at 1181; Keeton, supra
note 1, at 966-68. See also 7 S. WILLISTON, supra note 11, § 900, at 29-30 (describing
the typical insurance sales transaction).
90. See Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 278.
91. Id.
92. Id. See Note, supra note 1, at 621. But see Keeton, supra note 1, at 974-77
(Professor Keeton indicates that the insured's reasonable expectations should be
honored notwithstanding the insured's knowledge of the limiting provisions).
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others. ")3
III.
A.

DIscusSION
Ambiguity

Those dissatisfied with the extended form of the reasonable expectations doctrine, and the Atwater decision, cite the absence of the customary ambiguity prerequisite as the chief shortcoming.94
Opponents contend that such an absence encourages insureds to
forego reading their policies 9 5 and exaggerates expectations, which
invites inflated coverage. 9 6 The following discussion responds to
these criticisms.
1.

The Role of Ambiguity

The Minnesota Supreme Court does not eliminate ambiguity as a
pivotal consideration.97 The difference between the court's analysis
and critics' position is the function of ambiguity. Critics propose
that ambiguity should serve as a threshold to the application of the
doctrine.98 Accordingly, unless the language of the contract provision is found to be ambiguous, the insured is subject to the terms
and precluded from establishing his reasonable expectations.99
Conversely, the supreme court prescribes ambiguity as a factor to be
considered in determining the insured's reasonable expectations.OO
93. Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 278 (emphasis added).
94. See Kelso, Idaho and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations: A Springboard for an
Analysis of a New Approach to a Valuable but Often Misunderstood Doctrine, 47 INS. CoUNS. J.
325, 333 (1980); Note, supra note 3, at 1189-92; Note, supra note 1, at 617; see also
Squires, A Skeptical Look at the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectation, 6 F. 252, 256 (1971).
95. Cf Kelso, supra note 93, at 326-27; Note, supra note 1, at 619, 621 (stating
that the traditional form of the reasonable expectations doctrine would not eliminate
nor reward the failure of the insured to read the policy).
96. Kelso, supra note 94, at 333 (implying that the Keeton form of the reasonable
expectations doctrine results in "forced charity"). Cf Note, supra note 3, at 1191
(retreat from extended version due to excesses possible under this approach); Note,
supra note 1, at 617-19.
97. See Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 278.
98. See Kelso, supra note 94, at 331; Squires, supra note 94, at 256; Note, supra
note 1, at 620-21.
99. See Kelso, supra note 94, at 331; Squires, supra note 94, at 256; Note, supra
note 1, at 620-2 1.
100. Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 278. Recognizing the insured's reasonable expectations serves two fundamental purposes. See Abraham, supra note 1, at 1169-75. First,
because the reasonable expectations doctrine encourages insurers to clearly and conspicuously communicate policy information, economic efficiency is promoted. Id. at
1170. This is theoretically true since an informed person can make quicker, more
accurate decisions in the marketplace and can consequently better allocate his resources while pursuing self-interests. Id. Second, clear, conspicuous disclosure results in genuine assent or informed choice which is an end in itself. Id. at 1174.
Genuine assent is consistent with such legal doctrines as informed consent, duty to
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In view of the typically biased insurance policy transaction,'OI it is
both fair and appropriate for the supreme court to consider ambiguity as a factor rather than a prerequisite. By considering it as a factor, the trial court gives the insured the opportunity to establish that
his alleged expectations were reasonable.
2.

The Difficulty in DiscerningAmbiguity

The analysis used by courts to identify ambiguity in a contract is
often abstract and vague. 10 2 Part of the difficulty may be the absence
of a uniform, pragmatic definition of ambiguity. 103 The intrinsic difficulty and inconsistency of identifying ambiguity is evidenced by the
supreme court's decision in Atwater. The court was almost equally
divided as to the existence of ambiguity.104 The difficulty in identifying ambiguity underscores the unfairness of using ambiguity as a
threshold.105 Furthermore, requiring ambiguity as a prerequisite
would lead to dubious rulings.10 6 The court will need to find ambiguity in order to avoid enforcement of adhesion contracts,' 0 7 and
thus may be inclined to fabricate ambiguity in order to avoid rendering an unjust decision.108 The supreme court specifically adopted
warn about potential dangers of consumer products, and waiver of rights. Id. Professor Abraham states that the expectations doctrine should promote economic efficiency and informed consent. He proposes, however, that the doctrine may, in
practice, be limited in serving these ends. Id. at 1171-75.
101. The insured has little bargaining power during the insurance sales transaction. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., Bond Bros., Inc. v. Robinson, 471 N.E.2d 1332, 1335 (1984).
103. See Note, supra note 1, at 606-08.
104. Four of the nine justices concurring specially, believed the burglary definitions to be ambiguous. Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 279-80. See supra notes 65, 66 and
accompanying text.
105. This unfairness can be alleviated with ambiguity serving as a factor instead of
a threshold prerequisite. Hence, the questionable determination would only inhibit,
as opposed to preclude, the establishment of reasonable expectations.
106. 7 S. WILLISTON, supra note 11, § 900, at 17. Professor Williston states that
"[i]n order to prevent forfeiture of the policy or other types of overreaching by the
insurer, courts purport to find ambiguities whose existence is dubious, to say the
least." Id.
107. See Keeton, supra note 1, at 970-72; Note, supra note 1, at 604-06. Professor
Keeton, in explaining the dubious results, states:
The conclusion is inescapable that courts have sometimes invented ambiguity where none existed, then resolving the invented ambiguity contrary to
the plainly expressed terms of the contract document. To extend the principle of resolving ambiguities against the draftsman in this fictional way not
only causes confusion and uncertainty about the effective scope of judicial
regulation of contract terms but also creates an impression of unprincipled
judicial prejudice against insurers. If results in such cases are supportable at
all, generally it is because the principle of honoring policyholders' reasonable expectations applies.
Keeton, supra note 1, at 972.
108. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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the reasonable expectations doctrine to eliminate the arbitrary results that arise when traditional contract principles are manipulated
to achieve fairness.109
3.

The Responsibilityfor Reading the Policy

Both Professor Keeton and the Minnesota Supreme Court agree
that the reasonable expectations doctrine does not remove the insured's responsibility to read the insurance policy.I 10 The doctrine,
however, excuses the insured from possessing a thorough understanding of a contract that is excessively confusing and complex. III
The insured will merely be held to a "reasonable knowledge" of the
conditions and terms given the surrounding circumstances.' 12
B.

A Proposalfor Narrowing the Void

Opponents claim that the absence of the ambiguity prerequisite
exaggerates an insured's expectations, resulting in inflated coverage.] 3 A corollary contention is the court's inability to accurately
assess the insured's reasonable expectations.14 More precisely, opponents are troubled by the absence of specific, established inquiries
or factors with which to determine reasonable expectations.' 15
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court espouses three factors,
the court does not imply that these factors are conclusive.' 16 The
court implies that the surrounding circumstances must be consid109. See Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 278.
110. Id. at 278; Keeton, supra note 1, at 968.
111. Cf Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 278 (the court merely requires the insured to have
a reasonable knowledge of the policy's conditions and exclusions).
112. See id. at 278. Although the precise wording varies among the jurisdictions
recognizing either form of the reasonable expectations doctrine, the rudimentary
definition of reasonable knowledge is the understanding an ordinary layman would
have after a deliberate, but less than scrutinous, reading of the contract. See Grimes,
120 N.H. at 722, 422 A.2d at 1315 (examining the knowledge of a reasonably intelligent person after a more than casual reading of the policy); Chipokas, 267 N.W.2d at
396 (examining whether an ordinary layman would be misguided after reading the
policy).
113. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
114. See Note, supra note 1, at 617 (stating that the bargain protected by the courts
may not be indicated by the surrounding facts). Cf Kelso, supra note 94, at 331 (suggesting that the application of the Keeton form of the doctrine leads to unsupportable and haphazard results).
115. See Note, supra note 1, at 618; see also Note, Reasonable Expectations Approach to
Insurance Contract InterpretationAodified in Missouri, 47 Mo. L. REv. 577, 584-85 (1982).
Even the principal proponent of reasonable expectations, Professor Keeton, recognizes that the doctrine is "too general to serve as a guide from which particularized
decisions can be derived through an exercise of logic, and too broad to be universally
true ......
Keeton, supra note 1. at 967.
116. See Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 278-79.
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ered when determining reasonable expectations.' 17
In order to enhance the objectivity and predictability of the doctrine, a more discrete and refined approach must be established for
ascertaining the reasonableness of an expectation.' 18 Such an approach has not been fully established because the doctrine is in the
early stages of development.' 19 Therefore, courts and legal scholars
should focus their efforts on formulating inquiries or factors which
can ascertain the reasonableness of an alleged expectation.20 The
Minnesota Supreme Court has already begun this process.' 2'
In future cases, the supreme court should supplement its suggested criteria with the addition of a fourth factor. The proposed
factor pertains to "reasonable knowledge" as mentioned by the

23
court 12 2 and as adopted by the New Hampshire Supreme Court.'

117. "The insured may show what actual expectations he or she had, but the factfinder should determine whether those expectations were reasonable under the circumstances." Id. The totality-of-circumstances approach was recently adopted by the
United States Supreme Court for the purpose of resolving the ever-distressing issue
of probable cause. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). The Court stated
that the totality approach would yield a more honest and accurate assessment than a
rigid standard or formula in areas involving diverse fact settings. Id. at 232-35. The
Court concluded that "[r]igid legal rules are ill-suited to . . .area[s] of such diversity." Id. at 232.
Professor Corbin strongly recommends that the surrounding circumstances be
examined when interpreting the meaning of a contract. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 18,
§ 536, at 28. Requiring courts to ascertain the reasonable expectations of a person
has precedent in the area of criminal procedure-specifically, fourth amendment privacy issues. The United States Supreme Court has stated that in order to be protected from an unwarranted (and thus unreasonable) search and subsequent seizure,
a person must have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the area or item
searched. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1979) (elaborating on the
fourth amendment right of privacy as outlined in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967)); see also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-83 (1983). The reasonable
expectations test as stated in Smith consists of two parts. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740. The
first part is an examination of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether
the suspect's conduct exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy. Id. Conversely, the second part, which is objective in nature, determines whether the individual's genuine expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
Id.
118. See Abraham, supra note 1, at 1197-98.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., id. Perhaps in time, the courts will have established a list of "traditional" reasonable expectations with respect to insurance policies, resembling traditional reasonable expectations as to privacy. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82
(addressing traditional and non-traditional reasonable expectations).
121. See Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 278 (outlining three recommended factors for ascertaining reasonable expectations of insureds).
122. See id. The court stated that the insured should be held only to a "reasonable
knowledge of the literal terms and conditions" of the contract. The court, however,
did not define "reasonable knowledge." It stated only that the "insured may show
what actual expectations he had, but the factfinder should determine whether those
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The reasonableness of an expectation could be determined, in part,
by discerning the knowledge of "an ordinarily intelligent insured"
after a "more than casual reading" of the policy provision in question.124 Inexplicably, the court seems to have overlooked language
in the Readability of Insurance Policies Act that suggests this very
factor. 125 The Act requires that insurance provisions be "readable
and understandable to a person of average intelligence, expericence,
and education."1 26 This statutory language implies that if an insurance contract is readable to an ordinarily intelligent insured, his reasonable expectations will be influenced by the language of the
contract. The court ought to recognize that any determination of
reasonable expectations should reflect this statutory requirement.
Although this suggested factor would appear to overlap the ambiguity and public knowledge factors, it nevertheless refines the court's
approach. Conceivably, the policy language of a disputed provision
may be found unambiguous, but may still mislead an insured because the provision pertains to a substantive matter which is not generally understood by the public. The proposed factor could be used
under these circumstances to determine whether the expectations of
the insured were reasonable even though the language was unambiguous. The usefulness of this proposed factor is significantly greater
in situations where the language of the disputed provision is found
to be ambiguous. Thus, this factor could help to ascertain the reasonableness of any alleged expectation, whether based upon ambiguous language or not. In either scenario, the proposed factor could
protect against exaggerated expectations and could thus minimize
27
the threat of inflated coverage.'
expectations were reasonable under the circumstances." See infra text accompanying
note 126 (defining "reasonable knowledge").
123. See Grimes, 120 N.H. at 722, 422 A.2d at 1315. Professor Llewellyn has offered a second alternative to the contract of adhesion doctrine. See Note, supra note
3, at 1196-98 (citing K. LLEWELLYN, COMMON LAW TRADITION-DECIDING APPEALS
362-63, 370-71 (1960)). According to Llewellyn, a standard form contract results in
two separate contracts: the dickered deal; and the collateral one of supplementary boiler
plate. Id. at 1196. His theory is predicated on the presumption that the insurer and
consumer are aware that the latter will not read the contract in its entirety. Id. at
1197. The terms of the supplementary contract, which has been given general assent,
are honored to the extent that they do not undermine or thwart the dickered deal,
which has been given specific assent, and are not manifestly unconscionable or unfair. Id.
124. See Grimes, 120 N.H. at 723, 422 A.2d at 1315 (quoting Hanover Ins. Co. v.
Grondin, 119 N.H. 394, 397, 402 A.2d 174, 176 (1979)).
125. MINN. STAT. § 72C.02 (1984).
126. Id.
127. In the first scenario (where the disputed policy provision is found to be unambiguous), the provision would be enforced if an ordinarily intelligent person after a
more than casual reading of the policy provision would have known the meaning and
ramifications of the provision in question. In the second scenario (where the dis-
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CONCLUSION

In Atwater, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the reasonable
expectations doctrine. The court adopted the extended version of
the doctrine which does not require ambiguity before the doctrine is
applied. In doing so, the court has abandoned traditional theories of
contract interpretation which have often led to unfair results or
which have been stretched beyond their limits to achieve justice.
The court's action represents a step forward in balancing the interests of the insured against the traditionally more powerful insurance
company.
Hopefully, the court has only begun to develop the doctrine. It
must continue formulating specific factors by which reasonable expectations can be determined. Failure to accomplish this will necessarily result in a retreat to either the traditional contract of adhesion
doctrine or the common form of the reasonable expectations doctrine. 2 8 Although the Minnesota Supreme Court's efforts in Atwater
are commendable, the process of developing the reasonable expectations doctrine into a more principled, manageable contract theory
must continue.
GeraldJ. Morris
puted policy provision is determined to be ambiguous), the alleged expectation of
the insured would be recognized if it were consistent with the knowledge or understanding of an ordinarily intelligent person after a more than casual reading of the
provision. Recognition of the alleged expectation, in the second scenario, would be
especially appropriate if the insured's expectation regarding a certain term was also
consistent with the understanding of the general public's knowledge regarding that
matter. In both scenarios, however, a concerted, conspicuous disclosure by the insurer or its agent, of the exclusions or limitations, would defeat any alleged expectation. See supra note 84.
128. See Abraham, supra note 1, at 1196; Note, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations
in Massachusetts and New Hampshire: A Comparative Analysis, 17 NEW ENG. L. REv. 89 1,
923-24 (1982).
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